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BANK PROCYCLICALITY, CREDIT CRUNCHES, AND ASYMMETRIC 






Much concern has recently been expressed that both large, procyclical changes in bank assets 
and “credit crunches” caused by bank reluctance to expand loans during recessions contribute to 
economic instability. These effects are difficult to explain using the standard textbook model of 
deposit expansion in which deposits are constrained only by reserve requirements. However, 
these effects follow easily if the model is expanded to include a second, capital constraint. 
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BANK PROCYCLICALITY, CREDIT CRUNCHES, AND ASYMMETRIC 
MONETARY POLICY EFFECTS: A UNIFYING MODEL 
 
Introduction 
Much concern has been expressed recently about the perceived excessive procyclicality 
of banks that may exacerbate the cyclical behavior of the macroeconomy and, in particular, 
hamper recoveries from recessions. Although most industries experience cyclical movements in 
output and profitability in sympathy with the cyclical swings in the economy as a whole, such 
cyclicality in bank assets, loans, and capital tends to exceed that in the macroeconomy as well 
as in many other sectors of the economy, expanding faster in upturns and contracting faster in 
downturns. This pattern is perceived to be more important for banks than most other sectors of 
the economy both because banks provide demand deposits, the largest part of the money supply  
(M1 and M2), and are a major provider of credit to the economy. Furthermore, banks are used 
by the Federal Reserve as its primary channel for transmitting monetary policy. Fluctuations in 
bank deposits and credit thus have significant, indeed critical, effects on the macroeconomic 
activity and may amplify swings in the macroeconomy. As a result, among other things, the 
ability of the economy to recover from recessions may be restricted both because banks are 
unwilling or unable to increase their loans or total credit to satisfy the increasing demand for 
such loans or credit and because any increases in bank reserves from expansive Federal Reserve 
monetary policy may not be accompanied by corresponding increases in bank credit or deposits. 
This may result in “credit crunches” characterized by sharp increases in effective bank loan 
rates and widespread reports of unmet credit needs during periods of perceived expansive 
monetary policy. If such crunches exist, they may partial or totally frustrate the intended impact 
of the expansive monetary policy. The empirical evidence in support of the existence of credit 
crunches is inconclusive, primarily because of the inability to clearly differentiate between 
demand and supply forces.  
Credit crunches, excessive procyclicality in bank behavior, and limited effects of 
expansionary Fed monetary policy in economic recessions cannot easily be reconciled with 
what the usual simple textbook bank deposit or bank credit expansion model would predict to 
be outcomes of an expansive monetary policy. This paper develops a potential structural 
rationale for the existence of these three observations. We demonstrate that procyclicality, credit 
crunches, and the observed asymmetry in the effectiveness of Fed policy actions during  
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expansions and contractions may be a predictable outcome of a slightly more complex model 




The textbook model—a single constraint 
 In typical textbook models (e.g., Mishkin, 2001 and Kaufman, 1995), aggregate bank 
deposit and earning asset expansions are constrained on the supply side only by reserve 
requirements, usually expressed as a percent of deposits. Reserves are held by banks both 
voluntarily against the possible liquidity demands by depositors wishing to withdraw funds and 
by statute to satisfy requirements imposed by central banks. The effective reserve requirement is 
then the higher of that set by the regulatory agencies or that imposed by market forces. For 
convenience, in this paper we focus primarily on regulatory reserve requirements. We assume 
that any reserves held by the banking system above the effective requirement are “excess” 
reserves and are sub-optimal because they earn less than earning assets, such as loans and 
securities, and are not needed to satisfy depositor liquidity demand.  
Because holding non-earning excess reserves is sub-optimal, banks will seek to convert 
any excess reserves to earning assets. They do this by making loans or purchasing securities. In 
the process, they increase their deposits up to the limits imposed by the regulatory-required 
reserve ratio and the total reserves in the banking system. For example, consider the base case 
shown in the summary balance sheet in figure 1 for a greatly simplified representation of the 
banking system including cash reserves, earning assets (loans and securities), deposits and 
capital (equity). Assume that there is no prudential capital requirement but that the banks do 
hold capital and that the reserve requirement set by the Fed is 10% of deposits. Banks hold as 
many deposits as permitted, so that excess reserves are zero. Deposits are $1,120, total and 
required reserves are both $112, capital is $100, and earning asset are $1,108. The system is in 
equilibrium. 
Now assume that the Federal Reserve wishes to pursue an expansionary monetary policy 
in order to boost macroeconomic activity. To do so it lowers the Fed Funds rate by injecting 
$100 of new reserves into the system through purchasing securities from banks in open market 
                                                            
1 The importance of a capital requirements on bank credit has been previously noted by, among others, Thakor, 1996, Bernanke 
and Lown, 1991, and Van der Heuvel, 2002, but has not been fully integrated into the bank deposit expansion model.  
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 operations. The immediate effect on the banking system is shown in figure 2, panel A. The 
system is no longer in equilibrium. Total reserves increased to $212, the reserve ratio has 
increased to 18.9%, excess reserves increase to $100, bank earning assets have declined by 
$100, and deposits and required reserves have remained unchanged at $1,120 and $112, 
respectively. The newly created $100 in excess reserves is not optimal to the banks, which can 
increase profits by expanding their portfolios of earning assets through deposit creation. The 
banking system therefore expands lending, which creates new deposits, until excess reserves are 
again zero. This results in the new equilibrium balance sheet shown in figure 2, panel B. In this 
new equilibrium, deposits have increased by $1,000 from $1,120 to $2,120 and the earning 
assets of banks have increased by $900 from $1,108 to $2,008. In the process, the reserves-to-
deposit ratio has returned to the required minimum of 10%, so that banks are constrained from 
increasing earning assets further. In this situation, expansive monetary policy is successful in 
increasing banks’ credit, as the textbooks foretell. Note, however, that, although the dollar 
amount of capital in the banking system as a whole remained at $100, in percentage terms, 
capital has declined from 8.2% to 4.5% of assets and from 9.0% to 5.0% of earning assets. 
 
The reality—two constraints 
  In reality, banks are subject to capital requirements as well as reserve requirements. For 
example, for prudential purposes, bank regulators generally require banks to maintain capital at 
no less than a stated fraction of the bank’s total assets. In the early 1990s, risk-weighted capital 
requirements were added to the extant regulatory capital requirements based only on total 
assets. Under risk-weighted capital requirements, different types of assets are assigned different 
weights according to their perceived risk.  The greater is the perceived risk, the greater is the 
weight.   For instance, mortgage loans count less than loans to corporations.  The capital charge 
is then applied to the sum of the weighted assets.  This means that the composition of the bank’s 
assets as well as the total size of the portfolio matters in determining the regulatory capital 
charge. Proposals currently under consideration by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision 
would further refine the computation of risk-weighted assets by, among other things, allowing 
banks to use internal models to determine the risk weights for individual loans (rather than 
having the weights determined by creditor type). This raises the future possibility that the risk 
weight of particular loans could fluctuate with changing economic conditions. Thus, even  
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though regulatory capital ratios are fixed, the required capital that must be held depends on the 
size of the asset portfolio, its composition, and in the future on economic conditions. 
In addition to regulatory capital requirements, markets impose capital requirements of 
their own, through their demand to charge higher interest rates on deposits and other funding or 
their unwillingness to transact with banks that are perceived to have insufficient levels of 
capital. Rating agencies also consider capital levels in determining the creditworthiness of 
institutions. Lastly, for their own internal risk-management purposes, banks self-impose 
minimum levels of capital for the portfolio of assets and liabilities they hold, typically scaled by 
the riskiness of the positions. For purposes of illustration, we analyze the effects of monetary 
policy on the banking system of two different regulatory capital ratio requirements—capital-to-
earning-assets and capital-to-total-assets. By including capital requirements, bank deposit and 
credit expansions in the model are now subject to two constraints rather than only one 
constraint. 
  Returning to our previous base case (figure 1), assume that the regulatory authorities 
require banks to hold capital equal to 9.0% of aggregate earning assets and that banks do not 
want to hold capital in excess of the required minimum. The previous 10% reserves-to-deposits 
requirement remains in effect. In figure 1, both constraints are satisfied and, as there is no 
excess reserves or excess capital, the banking system is in equilibrium. To stimulate the 
economy, the Fed again injects $100 of new reserves into the banking system by purchasing 
securities from banks. The immediate effect is shown in figure 3, panel A. The banks are no 
longer in equilibrium. They are holding both excess reserves and, as earning assets decline, 
excess capital. As a result, the bank attempts to deploy the excess reserves by increasing earning 
assets through lending. However, the $100 of capital in the system can only sustain $1,108 of 
earning assets. Thus, once the banks have restored the $100 of earning assets lost through the 
sale of securities to the Fed, they can increase earning assets no further, resulting in the banking 
system balance sheet shown in figure 3, panel B. Even though the $90 of excess reserves is sub-
optimal, the binding capital constraint prevents the banks from further improving their balance 
sheet. Thus, when capital constraints are binding, the Fed may be unable to increase bank 
earning assets through monetary policy alone. 
   If the binding capital requirement were in terms of the capital-to-total assets rather than 
to earning-assets ratio, monetary policy could be even less effective in achieving an expansion 
in bank credit. Suppose the capital requirement was 8.0% of total assets. Then the $100 of  
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capital in the banking system could support at most $1,250 of total banking system assets. After 
the initial $100 reserve injection shown in figure 3 panel A, the efforts of the banking system to 
increase lending would result in the balance sheet shown in panel C. In this scenario, the capital 
requirement becomes binding when the level of earning assets is only $1,038. Because the 
constraint is on total assets, the composition of assets between earning and nonearning is 
irrelevant and the injection of reserves by the Fed actually has an immediate and seemingly 
perverse effect of actually reducing bank earning assets held by the banking system from $1,108 
in the original base case in figure 1 to $1,038. Deposits, however, increase by $30.
2 
  The twin constraints of reserve requirements and capital requirements mean that at times 
banks may hold either excess reserves or excess capital. It also means that, if monetary policy is  
concerned with credit provided through the banking system in addition to the level of interest 
rates, it is limited in its ability to increase bank credit whenever banks are capital constrained. 
The Fed can always make reserve requirements less binding by injecting reserves. But this will 
have the effect of expanding banks’ assets only if the system as a whole has the excess capital 
necessary to support an expanded portfolio of earning assets or banks can profitably raise 
additional capital. To achieve the $1,000 increase in deposits following an injection of $100 of 
reserves that would be expected to occur if reserve requirements were the only constraint 
(shown in figure 2, panel B), the banking system would have to raise an additional $66 of new 
capital, if the capital requirement were 9% of earning assets, or $84 of new capital, if the capital 
requirement were 8% of total assets. This would result in the aggregate balance sheets shown in 
figure 4, panel A and B.  In both panels, earning and total assets would be greater than in figure 
2 by the amount of the increase in capital. 
  The relationship among bank earning assets, reserves, and capital subject to both a 
reserve and capital constraint is developed mathematically in the Appendix and graphed in 
figure 5 for both a capital-to-earning assets requirement (Case 1) and a capital-to-total assets 
requirement (Case 2).  The graphs show the maximum dollar amount of earning assets that the 
banking system can support for different levels of total reserves provided by the Federal 
Reserve if the banks were subject to a reserve requirement of 10% of deposits and/or a capital 
                                                            
2 The $100 of securities purchased by the Federal Reserve do not disappear from the economy, only from the 
banking system’s balance sheet. When this is factored back in, the $100 injection of reserves produces a small net 
increase of economy-wide earning assets of $30, reflected in the $30 increase in deposits, even though bank 
earning assets decline slightly. The key distinction is that when the banking system is not capital constrained, a 
$100 injection of reserves produces a $1,000 increase in economy-wide earning assets; but when the banking 
system is capital constrained the increase in economy-wide earning assets is reduced to only $30.  
 6 
  
requirement of  8% of earning assets and 9% of total assets, respectively.  If there were no 
capital constraint, earning assets would increase linearly with reserves along the reserve 
constraint line.  Note that, when reserves are zero, earning assets are equal to the $100 of 
capital.  But, when a capital constraint is added, as reserves increase, earning assets increase 
only to the point where the capital constraint intersects the reserve constraint and becomes 
binding.  Thereafter, earning assets increase less as reserves increase than without the capital 
constraint and even decrease when the capital requirement is scaled to total assets. 
  When the capital constraint is binding, targeted increases in bank credit and deposits by 
the Federal Reserve may be achieved only if the banks can profitably raise the additional capital 
needed to support the higher level of assets. During contractions, external capital is likely to be 
more costly making banks reluctant to raise external funds that they may not be able to invest 
profitably. As a result, capital constraints are more likely to be binding during a recession than 
an expansion. This interaction of capital constraints and cyclical variations in the cost of 
external funds can explain an excessive procyclical pattern in bank assets.  
 
Implications for Monetary Policy 
Including a capital constraint in the bank expansion model has important implications 
for the effectiveness of monetary policy over the business cycle. As noted above, capital, which 
is not under central bank control, may become the binding constraint on banks during periods of 
economic recessions and monetary expansion. On the other hand, reserves, which are under 
central bank control, are the likely effective constraint on banks during periods of economic 
boom and  restrictive monetary regimes. Thus, insofar as monetary policy relies on bank 
deposits or bank credit to achieve its objectives, it may be easier for the Fed to restrain 
expansions then to stimulate recoveries. That is, the ability of monetary policy to stabilize the 
economy is asymmetrical.
3 
In addition to limiting the potential effectiveness of monetary policy in stimulating 
credit expansion, capital constraints may also impose a further negative effect on banking credit 
expansion. During economic downturns, when monetary policy seeks to stimulate bank lending, 
actual levels of bank capital are likely to be declining as loans default and are charged off and 
                                                            
3 Morgan (1993) provides empirical evidence of this asymmetry.  
 7 
  
loan-loss reserves replenished. If capital constraints are binding, this forces banks to reduce 
lending further unless they are able to raise additional capital profitably. 
The effective capital requirement may also increase during downturns if it is risk 
sensitive, as is currently the case under the requirements developed  by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision. Moreover, current proposals by the Committee would increase the risk 
sensitivity of these capital requirements further. The level of required regulatory capital would 
increase as the credit risk of the loan portfolio increases. In a downturn, this is likely to occur. 
Not only do more loans default, but the default risk of performing loans in the aggregate tends 
to increase, as does the expected loss when default occurs. This increases the risk-weighted 
value of existing assets, which in turn translates into an increase in the associated regulatory 
capital that must be held against those assets. As a result, in recessions, the level of earning 
assets that the banking system can support on the existing capital base is further reduced, giving 
rise to perceived credit crunches (Wagster, 1999). 
Earning assets (bank credit) may be divided into loans and securities (investments) and 
distinctions can be made between these with respect to economic impact. Some commentators 
perceive increases in loans to provide more stimulus than an equal dollar increase in securities 
(e.g., Bernanke and Blinder, 1988). Credit crunches are then defined in terms of loan levels 
and/or originations rather than in terms of earning assets. The empirical studies of the reported 
credit crunch sightings of the early 1990s frequently focused on the adverse impact of the 
existing risk-based Basel capital requirements, which were being phased in at the time. Under 
these standards, capital requirements on loans were generally have higher than capital 
requirements on investment securities.
4 Indeed, if U.S. Treasury securities are assigned a zero 
risk weight at U.S. banks, capital constrained banks can increase aggregate earning assets by 
purchasing these securities but not by expanding loans. However, even without Basel 
requirements, the market may impose differential capital requirements on different assets. Some 
observers (e.g., Kashyap and Stein, 1994 and 2000) also argue that, because the demand for 
                                                            
4 Because increases in loan losses in recessions often reflect risky loans made in previous expansions but viewed at 
the time as not risky, some analysts have recommended that loan-loss reserves accounting be changed to reserve 
more when loans are made rather than when they default.  That is, reserving should focus more on ex-ante loss 
behavior rather than ex-post.  Such accounting procedures would decrease reported bank capital during 
macroeconomics expansions but increase bank capital during macroeconomic recessions relative to current 
accounting practices and help reduce any excessive procyclicality in bank (Borio, 2002, and Borio, Furfine, and 
Lowe, 2001). This result presupposes that the market accepts the new accounting convention and that regulatory 
rather than market-imposed or prudential capital requirements are the binding constraint.  
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loans is weak in recessions, banks will expand securities rather than loans on any new reserves 
provided and thereby partially frustrate Fed expansionary intentions. 
 
Conclusion 
We have shown how the simple one-constraint (reserve requirements) model of 
monetary policy, which changes the deposits and assets of the banking system by injecting or 
withdrawing reserves and thereby changes interest rates, is incomplete. In practice, banks are 
subject to two constraints—capital as well as reserve requirements. Where capital requirements 
are binding, the model clearly shows that injection of additional reserves by the Fed may not 
achieve the intended increase in bank deposits and earning assets. 
If either constraint is binding, earning assets cannot grow further. Monetary policy can 
directly impact only one of the two potential constraints faced by banks—the reserve 
requirement—and is impotent to affect the other—capital—constraint. Where monetary policy 
seeks to increase earning assets, it can do so successfully through injection of reserves only if 
the effective capital requirement is not binding or if market conditions allow banks to raise the 
required additional capital profitably. On the other hand, if monetary policy seeks to constrain 
the growth of bank earning assets, e.g., to slow an overheated expansion, it is able to 
unambiguously do so by withdrawing reserves. In this case, banks must reduce their lending and 
investment in securities because they can no longer sustain the same level of deposits to support 
these investments. If, at this time, the capital constraint is not binding, banks will either hold 
excess capital or reduce the excess through stock buy-backs, dividend increases, or acquisitions.  
Observed fluctuations in the level of bank capital through the business cycle—higher 
capital ratios during economic expansions and lower ratios during recessions—together with 
changes in the effective capital requirement if the ratio is risk-sensitive, are likely to create 
further procyclical changes in bank loans and earning assets and give rise to perceived credit 
crunches. Capital requirements are likely to become binding at just the time that the Fed is 
seeking to stimulate credit expansion—at the bottom of a business cycle.  Thus, the introduction 
of the capital constraint in the bank deposit expansion model can explain the observed perceived 
excessive procyclicality in bank balance sheets, characterized by an expansion of bank credit 
and deposits that is more rapid than the growth of the economy as a whole during expansions 
and declines in these measures that is more rapid than declines in the macroeconomy during  
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recessions. The two-constraint model also explains the potential for credit crunches during the 
early stages of a macroeconomic recovery, and the frequently greater effectiveness of monetary 
policy in restraining booms than in stimulating recoveries. 
If, in recessions, banks cannot raise new capital at favorable prices, the only direct tool 
the Fed has to remove a binding capital constraint and encourage increases in bank credit and 
deposits is to lower the regulatory capital requirement. However, this has potential adverse 
consequences for bank safety and soundness and, in any case, may not be sufficient if the 
effective capital requirement is being determined by the market or internal bank risk-
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Appendix: Mathematics of the Twin Constraints 
The dilemma facing the Federal Reserve when it is seeking to increasing bank earning 
assets can be shown mathematically. Consider a simple bank balance sheet consisting of earning 
assets,  EA, reserves, R, deposits, D, and capital, C. The accounting identity requires that 
. R EA D C += +  The bank faces a reserve requirement stipulating that the reserves-to-deposit 
ratio may not exceed r; so  . r D R ×≤  The bank also faces a required capital ratio, k. If this ratio 
is based on earning assets, then  . k EA C ×≤  If the ratio is based on total assets, then 
( ) . k EA R C ×+ ≤ Using these relations, and depending on the form the capital constrain takes, 
it is possible to show that earning assets are constrained as follows: 
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From these equations we can see that in the earning assets-to-capital ratio case, reserves 
have no effect on the capital constraint. Therefore, when this constraint becomes binding, 
increasing reserves cannot increase earning assets. In the total assets-to-capital ratio case, 
reserves have the perverse effect of reducing the ceiling on earning assets imposed through the 















=× +  

 
Figure 5 illustrates these effects. For this example reserves and capital are both held 
fixed at $100, the reserve requirement is set at 10%, and the capital requirement is set at 9% of 
either earning assets (Case 1) or total assets (Case 2). The region labeled “Feasible earning 
assets/reserves combinations” shows the joint effect of the two constraints in limiting the 







Figure 1: Base Case 
Reserves 
(Total)  112  1120  Deposits 
Required  112    
Excess      0    
      
Earning  
Assets  1108   100  Capital 
Totals  1220  1220  
Ratios Actual  Req’d   
Reserves/ 
Deposits  10.0% 10.0%   
Capital/ 
Earn. Assets  9.0% N/A   
Capital/ 





Figure 2 (Reserve Requirement Constraint) 
Panel A: After injection of reserves    Panel B: After increase in earning assets 
Reserves 
(Total)  212  1120  Deposits    Reserves 
(Total)  212  2120  Deposits 
Required             112       Required            212      
Excess             100       Excess                0    
               
Earning  
Assets  1008    100  Capital    Earning 
Assets  2008    100  Capital 
Totals  1220  1220    Totals  2220  2220  
Ratios Actual  Req’d     Ratios  Actual  Req’d   
Reserves/ 
Deposits  18.9% 10.0%     Reserves/ 
Deposits  10.0% 10.0%   
Capital/ 
Earn. Assets  9.9% N/A     Capital/ 
Earn. Assets  5.0% N/A   
Capital/ 
Assets  8.2% N/A     Capital/ 






Figure 3 (Reserve and Capital Requirement Constraints) 
Panel A: After injection of reserves    Panel B: After increase in earning assets 
Reserves 
(Total)  212  1120  Deposits    Reserves 
(Total)  212  1220  Deposits 
Required          112       Required           122      
Excess          100       Excess             90    
             
Earning  
Assets  1008   100  Capital    Earning 
Assets  1108    100  Capital 
Totals  1220  1220    Totals  1320  1320  
Ratios Actual  Req’d      Ratios  Actual  Req’d   
Reserves/ 
Deposits  18.9% 10.0%     Reserves/ 
Deposits  17.4% 10.0%   
Capital/ 
Earn. Assets  9.9% 9.0%     Capital/ 
Earn. Assets  9.0% 9.0%   
Capital/ 
Assets  8.2% N/A     Capital/ 
Assets  7.6% N/A   
 
Panel C:  After increase in earning 
assets 
Reserves 
(Total)  212  1150  Deposits 
Required  115    
Excess    97    
      
Earning  
Assets  1038    100  Capital 
Totals  1250  1250  
Ratios Actual  Req’d   
Reserves/ 
Deposits  18.4% 10.0%   
Capital/ 
Earn. Assets  9.6% N/A   
Capital/ 





Figure 4 (Reserve and Capital Requirement Constraints) 
Panel A: After injection of reserves and 
raising capital  
(w/ earning assets/capital requirement) 
  Panel B: After injection of reserves and 
raising capital 
(w/ total assets/capital requirement) 
Reserves 
(Total)  212  2120  Deposits    Reserves 
(Total)  212  2120  Deposits 
Required           212       Required           212      
Excess               0       Excess               0    
             
Earning  
Assets  2074    166  Capital    Earning 
Assets  2092    184  Capital 
Totals  2286  2286    Totals  2304  2304  
Ratios  Actual Req’d     Ratios  Actual Req’d  
Reserves/ 
Deposits  10.0% 10.0%     Reserves/ 
Deposits  10.0% 10.0%   
Capital/ 
Earn. Assets  9.0% 9.0%     Capital/ 
Earn. Assets  8.8% N/A   
Capital/ 
Assets  7.3% N/A     Capital/ 
Assets  8.0% 8.0%   
 
 
 Case 1: Capital-to-Earning Assets Requirement


























Case 2: Capital-to-Total Assets Requirement
Reserves
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